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Abstract 
 
 A prime objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent changes to stock 
exchange listing standards is to improve the quality of financial reporting.  We examine 
the associations between audit committee financial expertise and alternate corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management.  We find that both accounting and 
certain types of non-accounting financial expertise reduce earnings management for firms 
with weak alternate corporate governance mechanisms, but that independent audit 
committee members with financial expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings 
management.  Importantly we find that alternate corporate governance mechanisms are 
an effective substitute for audit committee financial expertise in constraining earnings 
management.  Finally, we find either no association or a positive association between 
financial expertise and real earnings management.  Our results suggest that alternate 
governance approaches are equally effective in improving the quality of financial 
reporting, and that firms should have the flexibility to design the particular set of 
governance mechanisms that best fit their unique situations.     
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Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms, and Earnings Management 
 
1.  Introduction 
 The U.S. Congress, in enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ, in modifying their listing 
requirements in December 1999, place great reliance on the company’s audit committee 
as a means of protecting the integrity of the financial reporting system.  However, while 
these rules provide clear standards on audit committee independence and number of 
committee members, they are ambiguous on the definition and even the need for an audit 
committee financial expert.  Thus, the desirability and efficacy of how an audit 
committee financial expert improves a firm’s corporate governance environment and its 
financial reporting process is an open question. 
 We contribute to this debate by examining the role that an audit committee 
financial expert plays in mitigating earnings management for a broad sample of NYSE 
and NASDAQ firms in 2003, the first year that public companies are required to 
designate whether they have a financial expert on the audit committee and the name of 
that financial expert.  We choose earnings management as our metric because one of the 
main goals of SOX is to limit earnings manipulations (see SEC, 2003c).  In support of 
this, Li et al. (2006) find that the positive stock price reaction to events surrounding the 
passage of SOX in 2002 are related directly to the firm’s previous earnings management. 
Further, Cohen et al. (2005) report a significant drop in earnings management following 
SOX, although they also find that managers increased “real” earnings management (e.g., 
a reduction in R&D or advertising expenses) during the same time period. 
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Our study focuses primarily on two issues: (1) discerning among the differing 
definitions of “financial expertise” and (2) the interactions between having an audit 
committee financial expert and other corporate governance mechanisms.  The motivation 
behind examining these issues is that SOX, the SEC, and the stock exchanges provide a 
great deal of flexibility to firms in choosing the role that the financial expert plays within 
their overall corporate governance structures.   
SOX does not require a firm to include a financial expert on its audit committee; 
it merely mandates that the firm discloses in its filings whether the committee has such an 
expert, and if not to explain why.  SOX also assigned the designation of what constitutes 
a financial expert to the SEC, although the Act described a financial expert as someone 
with experience in preparing or auditing financial statements and the firm’s internal 
controls.  Initially, the SEC proposed this limited definition of a financial expert.  
However, in response to concerns from the corporate community, the SEC greatly 
expanded its definition to include shaded degrees of expertise. As a result, firms are able 
to designate a financial expert from a larger cadre of directors, including top managers 
from other companies, investment bankers, venture capitalists, and others. 
In addition to SOX, the NYSE and NASDAQ have their sets of corporate 
governance listing standards. Beginning in 1999, the NYSE and the NASDAQ ostensibly 
require a listed firm to include a financial expert on its audit committee.  However, a 
perusal of the exchanges’ definitions of whom qualifies as an expert reveals that they are 
broadly-based, thereby setting a low threshold for inclusion.  Further, while SOX is silent 
on other board characteristics, the exchanges’ listing standards provide for alternative 
board governance mechanisms, such as a majority of independent board members and 
requiring the board nominating and executive compensation functions to be enacted by 
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independent board members only.  Thus the rules and regulations surrounding audit 
committee financial experts are quite expansive, suggesting a wide degree of 
substitutability among alternative corporate governance mechanisms as well as abilities 
among directors to act as financial experts. 
Our results both support and reject these conjectures.  First, there is a significant 
relation between having a financial expert on the audit committee and a lower level of 
earnings management.  However, this association is most pronounced when the 
designated financial expert has prior work experience in accounting, for example, s(he) is 
a CPA, former CFO, corporate treasurer or controller.  In contrast, we find no significant 
relation between earnings management and the SEC’s or the exchanges’ expanded 
definitions of financial expertise, for example, s(he) is/was a CEO of another firm, 
banker, or venture capitalist.  However, when we split non-accounting financial experts 
into two groups, senior business executives and other non-accounting experts, we find a 
negative relation between other non-accounting financial experts and earnings 
management, but no relation between earnings management and senior business 
executives of other firms.  Moreover, we also find that the relation between earnings 
management and an accounting financial expert and between earnings management and 
other non-accounting financial experts is stronger when these experts are independent.  
Second, there is a trade-off between having a restrictively-defined financial expert and 
other corporate governance monitoring mechanisms.  We find that having an accounting-
based financial expert on the audit committee or good corporate governance (later 
defined) lessens earnings management.  Combining the two has no incremental tangible 
effects on reducing earnings management.  In contrast, and consistent with our first 
finding, non-accounting financial experts neither add nor detract from a firm’s good 
 4
corporate governance practices when applied to managing earnings.  We therefore 
conclude that SOX’s disclosure requirements and the exchanges’ flexible listing 
standards on audit committee financial experts are adequate mechanisms to ensure the 
integrity of the corporate reporting system.  
We also examine whether the presence of an audit committee financial expert is 
associated with real earnings management.  Graham et al. (2005; 2006) provide details on 
a Fall 2003 survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) about earnings management.  They 
report that the vast majority of CFOs consider EPS to be an important reported number 
and that CFOs are willing to engage in real earnings management to meet earnings 
expectations or to smooth earnings.  Cohen et al. (2005) provide evidence that since the 
enactment of SOX, GAAP earnings management has declined but real earnings 
management has increased.  Since real earnings management is within the bounds of 
GAAP, we argue that it is not in the purview of the audit committee.  In fact, we argue 
that the postponement of real investments may fly below the radar screen of the entire 
board of directors.  Thus, we predict and find no significantly negative association 
between financial expertise, other corporate governance attributes and real earnings 
management. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of research.  There is a growing empirical 
literature documenting the effects that SOX and market regulations have had on earnings 
management (e.g., see Cohen et al., 2005; Klein, 2002a;  Carver, 2005).1  Further, within 
this body of research, there are papers examining the role that audit committee financial 
expertise has on auditor independence (Carcello and Neal, 2003), fraud and earnings 
restatements (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), financial reporting quality 
                                                 
1 See DeFond and Francis (2005) for an excellent summary of the audit research before and after the 
enactment of SOX. 
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(Felo et al., 2003) and earnings management itself (Xie et al., 2003).  The financial expert 
papers yield different conclusions, primarily because they use different definitions of 
financial expertise.  Our paper provides evidence that directors with direct experience in 
creating financial reports are better able to curb earnings management than those 
directors whose experience is as a CEO/President of another firm.  This finding is 
consistent with DeFond et al. (2005) who find that the market reacts positively to the 
appointment of a financial expert with prior accounting experience but has no reaction to 
the appointment of a non-accounting financial expert (DeFond et al. define a non-
accounting financial expert as a CEO or president of a for-profit corporation). 
Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on the costs of regulation 
and SOX itself on firms (e.g., see Ribstein, 2002; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; 
Romano, 2005; Zhang, 2005; Li et al., 2006). While we do not directly measure the costs 
of having an audit committee financial expert, we present evidence consistent with the 
view that allowing firms discretion in selecting from a menu of corporate governance 
choices is a viable option towards achieving investor protection.  This finding is 
consistent with Klein (2002b), DeFond et al. (2005), and Carver (2005), who examine the 
contextual role of various audit committee characteristics.  
We also contribute to the growing literature on “real” vs. “GAAP” earnings 
management (Roychowdhury, 2005; Cohen et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2005; 2006).  
SOX was enacted to improve the reliability of the financial reporting system.  It does not 
deal with the more subtle, but equally pervasive, management of earnings through the 
delay or cutting back of real investments within the firm.  Our results show that, as 
expected, the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee is negatively related 
to “GAAP” earnings management but is not similarly related to “real” earnings 
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management.  In fact, although we find no significant relation between audit committee 
financial experts and management of abnormal production costs, we do find a 
significantly positive relation between accounting financial experts and earnings 
management via abnormal discretionary expenditures. Therefore, other means besides 
government regulation may be needed to curb the latter type of managerial behavior. 
 Section 2 provides further background on the relation between earnings 
management and financial expertise and other corporate governance mechanisms, and 
discusses the hypotheses between these factors and real earnings management.  Section 3 
describes our research method and Section 4 presents our results.  Section 5 presents 
other analyses, and the results of testing the relation between real earnings management 
and financial expertise and other governance mechanisms are presented in Section 6.  
Section 7 summarizes and recognizes the limitations of our study. 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Financial expertise and earnings management 
 The preamble to SOX is one line, stating that the purpose of the Act is to “protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures pursuant to 
the security laws, and for other purposes” (SOX 2002).  Although there are several ways 
to gauge the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures, we examine the effects of 
an audit committee financial expert on earnings management, where we define earnings 
management as abnormal accruals.   
Section 407 of SOX requires public companies to disclose whether a financial 
expert is included on the audit committee. This requirement reflects a belief on the part of 
Congress that “… the effectiveness of the audit committee depends in part on its 
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members’ knowledge of and experience in auditing and financial matters” (U.S. Senate 
2002, 32).   Section 407 also delegated to the SEC the authority to define financial 
expertise.  
 SOX was enacted on July 30, 2002.  In Section 407, the SEC was given a 
deadline of 90 days after the enactment of the Act to propose rules to implement this 
section and an additional 90 days thereafter to issue its final rules.  On October 22, 2002, 
the SEC issued its proposal on 407, including a tentative definition of a “financial 
expert,” which mimicked the language in SOX (SEC 2002).   Specifically: 
“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the Commission, in defining the term ‘financial 
expert,’ to consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public 
accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, or controller, or principal accounting 
officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar functions: 
 
1. an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements; 
2. experience in (a) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally 
comparable issuers; and (b) the application of such principles in connection with 
the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
3. experience with internal accounting controls; and 
4. an understanding of the audit committee functions. 
 
We label a director on the audit committee with these qualifications as an 
accounting financial expert since the director is required to have actual experience in 
accounting.  The SEC proposal also broadened SOX by proposing that companies 
disclose whether the designated financial expert is an independent board member, and if 
not, an explanation as to why not. 
 On January 23, 2003, the SEC issued its final rules on implementing Section 407 
(SEC 2003a).  These rules became effective on March 31, 2003 (SEC 2003b).  
Specifically, a company is required to disclose whether it has at least one “audit 
committee financial expert” (ACFE) serving on its audit committee, and if so, the name 
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of the expert and whether the expert is independent of management. These rules are 
generally consistent with the October proposal. 
One major change from the original SEC rule proposal to the final rule was a 
dramatic expansion in the definition of a financial expert.  The expansion in the definition 
of a financial expert was in response to the following concerns: (1) difficulty in attracting 
a financial expert under the original (restricted) definition, and (2) to include a financial 
expert on its audit committee, companies would have to sacrifice the diversity of their 
boards by appointing directors that are not best-suited to the overall needs of their 
companies. To accommodate these concerns, the SEC expanded those qualifying as 
“audit committee financial experts” to include directors with experience in analyzing, or 
evaluating financial statements, as well as to those actively supervising others who 
perform any of these activities.  Thus, beginning March 31, 2003, the SOX definition of a 
financial expert is closer to the NYSE’s and NASDAQ’s delineation of a financial expert 
director. We refer to these directors as non-accounting financial experts because they are 
not required to directly have accounting experience.  See Appendix A for the SOX, 
NYSE and NASDAQ definitions and rules. 
 Our primary hypothesis throughout the paper is that audit committee financial 
expertise mitigates “GAAP” earnings management due to the financial expert having the 
training and experience to recognize accounting manipulations. The narrow definition of 
an ACFE in SOX, alongside the SEC’s subsequent broadening of that definition and the 
stock exchanges’ expansive delineation of whom an ACFE is, allows us to present 
several testable hypotheses on what type of background and experience is necessary for 
the financial expert to be an effective monitor of earnings management. 
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 We begin our hypothesis section by proposing a negative relation between 
earnings management and having any type of financial expert on the audit committee.  In 
the alternative form:  
H1:  There is a significant negative association between abnormal accruals 
(earnings management) and the presence of an ACFE (accounting or non-
accounting), as disclosed by firms. 
  
Empirical support for H1 comes from Abbott et al. (2004) and Bédard et al. 
(2004), who report negative relations between earnings restatements or aggressive 
earnings management and an ACFE, in which the ACFE has either accounting or non-
accounting expertise.2   
 However, DeFond et al. (2005) provide evidence that accounting and non-
accounting ACFEs may provide different degrees of financial expertise.   They find a 
significantly positive average stock price reaction to the appointment of an accounting 
ACFE, but no significant stock price reaction to the appointment of a non-accounting 
ACFE.  They argue that these results are consistent with accounting ACFEs, but not non-
accounting ACFEs, having the necessary skills to improve the audit committee’s ability 
to ensure “high-quality financial reporting.”  DeFond et al.’s (2005) findings suggest that 
we split financial experts into two classes based on whether they are accounting or non-
accounting experts.  We present the following two hypotheses: 
H2a: There is a significant negative association between the presence of an 
accounting ACFE and abnormal accruals 
                                                 
2 Abbott et al. (2004) define a financial expert as a CPA, investment banker, venture capitalist, CFO, 
controller, or someone who has held a senior management position (CEO, President, EVP, SVP, VP) with 
financial responsibilities.  Bédard et al. (2004) include CPAs, CFAs, and those with “experience in finance 
or accounting” as financial experts. 
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H2b: There is a significant negative association between the presence of a non-
accounting ACFE and abnormal accruals. 
  
Several studies support the view that independent directors are better monitors of 
the financial reporting system (e.g., Carcello and Neal, 2000; 2003; Klein 2002b). The 
SEC requires firms to disclose whether the ACFE (if there is one) is independent of 
management (SEC 2002; SEC 2003a).  Although Section 301 of SOX requires firms to 
have independent audit committees, the SEC defines independence in the context of 
compensation or advisory fees received by the director or by the amount of control that 
the director has over the firm (SEC 2003c).  In contrast, the exchanges have more 
stringent definitions of director independence, for example limiting personal or family 
ties with the firm, but they also allow for a limited opt-out at the board’s discretion.  
Thus, the differing definitions of board independence and inclusion requirements could 
result in non-independent directors serving on the audit committee.  This suggests the 
following hypotheses: 
H3a:  The association between an accounting ACFE and abnormal accruals is 
stronger when the expert is independent, where independence is defined to 
preclude all financial and personal ties between director and firm. 
H3b: The association between a non-accounting ACFE and abnormal accruals is 
stronger when the expert is independent, where independence is defined to 
preclude all financial and personal ties between director and firm. 
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2.2 Other corporate governance mechanisms, financial expertise, and earnings 
management 
 In December 1999, the NYSE and NASDAQ established new listing requirements 
on audit committee composition.  Both markets require listed firms to have independent 
audit committees (with some flexibility for a limited opt-out) of at least three members.  
In November 2003, the NYSE and NASDAQ adopted new listing requirements for board 
independence, nominating, and compensation committees.  Both markets require firms to 
have majority independent boards, and have placed the functions of board nominations 
and executive compensation into the hands of the board’s independent directors.3 
 The establishment of corporate governance listing standards alongside the fact 
that SOX does not mandate firms to include a financial expert on its audit committee 
suggests that Congress and the stock markets view audit committee expertise and other 
corporate governance mechanisms as substitutes for quality financial reporting. 
 DeFond et al. (2005) investigate whether the market’s reaction to the appointment 
of an accounting ACFE is complementary or a substitute to the firm’s overall governance 
environment.  They find that the positive market reaction to the appointment of an 
accounting ACFE is greater for firms with strong governance mechanisms than for firms 
with weak governance mechanisms.  DeFond et al. (2005) conclude that audit committee 
financial expertise and other corporate governance mechanisms are complements, 
although DeFond and Francis (2005) caution that there is a dearth of research examining 
the contextual nature of competing governance structures. 
 Given the tension between the regulators and DeFond et al’s (2005) results, we 
present the following hypothesis in the null: 
                                                 
3 The NYSE mandates the establishment of separate, independent nominating and compensation 
committees.  The NASDAQ’s rules are more flexible – allowing for these functions to be placed in the 
hands of non-independent directors alone (see Klein, 2003). 
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H4: The association between abnormal accruals and a financial expert (variously 
defined) is not dependent on the overall strength of the firm’s corporate 
governance environment. 
 
2.3 Real Earnings Management, Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Audit 
Committee Financial Expertise 
 Real earnings management is when managers take real economic actions to 
manage quarterly or annual earnings (or EPS).  Graham et al. (2005) find that 80 percent 
of surveyed CFOs admit they would be willing to decrease discretionary spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet earnings expectations.  More than half of the 
CFOs (55.3 percent) report they would delay a positive net present value investment 
project to meet earnings expectations.4  Empirically, Roychowdhury (2005) finds 
evidence that managers use R&D, advertising, SG&A, and production costs to manage 
earnings for a sample of firms between 1987-2001.  Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee 
(1998) find similar results for R&D expenditures alone.  Cohen et al. (2005), using 
Roychowdhury’s (2005) methodology, report a rise in real earnings management after the 
enactment of SOX. 
 Real earnings management may diminish firm and shareholder value, but it is not 
illegal.  Further, it is not a violation of financial reporting rules, and even if discovered 
would not result in charges of financial fraud or create cause for an earnings restatement. 
Thus, we argue that it is beyond the scope of the audit committee’s responsibility to filter 
                                                 
4 Graham et al. (2005; 2006) also present evidence that CFOs are willing to use “GAAP” earnings 
management to meet earnings targets.  Graham et al. (2005) report that 40.4 percent of CFOs are willing to 
book revenues early, 27.9 percent would draw down on reserves previously set aside, 21.3 percent would 
postpone taking an accounting charge, and 20.2 percent are willing to sell investments or assets to 
recognize the gain this quarter. 
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out real earnings management.   Therefore, we present the following hypothesis in the 
null: 
H5: There is no association between real earnings management and the presence 
of an audit committee financial expert. 
  
3.  Research Method 
3.1 Data 
We select a choice-based sample of 350 non-financial, domestic firms from 
Compact D/SEC with fiscal year ends between July 15, 2003 and December 31, 2003,5 
and that are traded on the NYSE, Nasdaq’s National Market (NNM), and Nasdaq’s Small 
Cap Market (SCM).  We select a sample rather than testing the entire population of firms 
because classifying audit committee members as an accounting ACFE or a non-
accounting ACFE requires reading each audit committee member’s biographical sketch 
in the proxy statement.  This process is labor intensive and non-trivial.  We eliminate 
firms that do not have adequate data on Compustat to calculate either abnormal accruals 
or the necessary control variables, and firms that do not have the corporate governance 
data needed for us to compute our measure of overall corporate governance quality.  We 
have a final useable sample of 283 firms. 
We first examine each firm to determine whether they have disclosed at least one 
ACFE.  Fifty-seven firms state that they do not have an ACFE.6  For the remaining 226 
                                                 
5 The SEC’s final rule on the disclosure of whether the firm has an ACFE was effective for fiscal years 
ending on or after July 15, 2003.  Our sample is choice-based to ensure an adequate number of firms with 
no ACFE. 
 
6 Based on our reading of the proxy statement for these 57 firms, none of the audit committee members 
appeared to qualify as an accounting ACFE.  Although some of the audit committee members at these firms 
had similar backgrounds to non-accounting ACFEs at other firms, these individuals were not designated as 
an ACFE by the firms where they sat on the audit committee. 
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firms, we examine the background of each disclosed ACFE to determine if they had 
previous experience in accounting.  Consistent with the original definition of SOX, we 
define an accounting ACFE to be any ACFE with current or previous experience as a 
CPA, CFO, controller, treasurer, or vice president–finance.  All other disclosed ACFEs 
are considered non-accounting ACFEs.  An examination of our sample indicates that 141 
firms have at least one accounting ACFE, and 85 have at least one non-accounting ACFE 
but no accounting ACFE.   
Table 1 presents details on the job backgrounds of the accounting ACFEs 
(ACC_ACFE) and the non-accounting ACFEs (NONACC_ACFE), including 
information on when these individuals joined the audit committee. Although only 226 
firms have an ACFE, there are 317 individual ACFEs in our sample because some firms 
have disclosed more than one ACFE.  As Panel A shows, approximately two-thirds 
(103/160) of the ACC_ACFEs serve, or have served, as a chief financial officer (CFO), 
and almost 30 percent (45/160) of the ACC_ACFEs who are not CFOs are CPAs.  Over 
80 percent (129/157) of the NONACC_ACFEs hold (held) non-financial positions as 
senior business executives (e.g., CEO, President, Chairman of the Board, Chief Operating 
Officer, Vice President).  The remaining NONACC_ACFEs include investment bankers, 
venture capitalists, consultants, private investors, attorneys, and academics.  
We also gathered data on when the ACFEs joined the audit committee.  Forty-six 
percent (31 percent) of the ACC_ACFEs (NONACC_ACFEs), respectively, joined the 
audit committee within the past two years.  This suggests that SOX’ financial expert 
requirement has led to substantial changes on corporate audit committees, presumably 
consistent with the objective of the law.  Moreover, accounting experts are approximately 
50 percent more likely to have been added to the audit committee than are non-
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accounting experts.  This, too, is consistent with the intent of the law.  However, it 
remains an empirical question as to whether ACC_ACFEs are more effective in 
monitoring the financial reporting process than are NONACC_ACFEs, and an empirical 
question as to whether the benefits of effective monitoring can be achieved through 
mechanisms other than the presence of an ACFE. 
 
3.2 Abnormal accruals 
Previous literature has examined abnormal accruals using many different models.  
Dechow et al. (1995) conduct tests to determine which model is most effective at 
separating abnormal accruals from “normal” accruals.  They conclude that the Modified 
Jones Model is best at identifying abnormal accruals.  Based on these findings we employ 
the Modified Jones Model to estimate abnormal accruals for each sample company.   
We begin by estimating the expected accruals for each firm i in industry j, using 
ordinary least squares regression.  The model is: 
(1) ijijijijijijijijijij PPEARREVAssetslagTA εβββα ++∆−∆++= 321 )()1/1(  
where TAij is total accruals for firm i in industry j [Compustat item #18 – (Compustat 
item #308 – Compustat item #124)], ∆REVij is the one year change in net revenues 
[Compustat item #12], ∆ARij is the one year change in accounts receivable [Compustat 
item #2], and PPEij is gross property, plant, and equipment [Compustat item #7].  All 
variables are scaled by lagged total assets.  The changes in revenues, receivables, and 
PPE, calculated as the difference between years t and t-1, control for the expected 
components of total accruals.    
Industry-specific expected accruals are calculated using all firms on Compustat 
with the same three, two, or one-digit SIC code, conditional on having at least 20 firms 
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with usable data in each SIC group.7  Abnormal accruals (AAC) are the prediction errors 
from equation (1).  More specifically, we calculate abnormal accruals as the difference 
between the total accruals for each firm less the expected industry specific accruals for 
that firm based on the estimated coefficients from equation (1): 
(2) ).ˆ][ˆ)1/1(ˆˆ( 321 iiiiiiiiii PPEARREVAssetslagTAAAC βββα +∆−∆++−=  
 
Consistent with Kothari et al. (2005), we performance-adjust the abnormal 
accruals based on each sample firm’s prior year return-on-assets (ROA).   This procedure 
controls for “normal” earnings management given the sample firm’s level of 
performance.   Specifically, we rank firms within each industry group into deciles based 
on their prior year’s return-on-assets (ROA) and calculate the median abnormal accruals 
for each industry group ROA decile, where the median ROA value excludes the 
particular sample firm.  We then calculate the performance-adjusted abnormal accrual for 
each sample firm by taking the difference between the sample firm’s abnormal accruals 
and the median abnormal accruals from the appropriate industry group ROA decile. 
 Since our sample is a relatively small percentage of all public companies – due to 
the difficulty in hand collecting proxy data – there is always some risk that our results are 
sample specific.  In particular, we are concerned that our sample is stratified in terms of 
earnings growth, risk, or size, parameters that have been shown to produce biased 
measures of earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005).   To address this concern, we 
compare our sample firms with the entire Compustat population on four metrics: sales 
growth, book-to-market ratio (M/B), firm size, and operating cash flow (OCF) (see 
Kothari et al., 2005).  We partition the Compustat universe into quartiles for each of these 
four metrics.  If our sample mirrors the Compustat population, we would expect 
                                                 
7 To control for the effect of outliers, total accruals are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles prior to the 
estimation of normal accruals. 
 17
approximately half of our sample observations to fall within the first and fourth quartiles 
for each of these metrics.  The percentage of our sample that falls within the first and 
fourth quartiles for sales growth, M/B ratio, firm size, and OCF is 46 percent, 47 percent, 
48 percent, and 47 percent, respectively.  These results suggest that our sample is similar 
to the overall Compustat population, and suggest that our results are not driven by the 
unique properties of our sample. 
 
3.3 Model 
We initially test the relation between abnormal accruals and the existence of an 
ACFE (regardless of type) using the following regression model: 
LN_ABS_PAC =  b0 + b1ACFE + b2STRONGGOV + b3ACFE*STRONGGOV + 
           b4SIZE + b5M/B + b6DISTRESS + b7OCF + b8LEVERAGE +  
      b9BIG4 + ε 
 
We define the dependent, test, and control variables as follows: 
  
LN_ABS_PAC 
 
= 
 
natural log of the absolute value of the discretionary accrual 
measure adjusted for performance;8 
ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one ACFE, else 0; 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the firm has strong overall corporate governance based on a 
six-factor measure, else 0 (see definition below); 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B 
 
= 
 
market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF 
 
= 
 
cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year 
total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
 
                                                 
8 We use the absolute value of the performance-adjusted abnormal accruals (ABS_PAC) as a proxy for the 
combined effect of both income increasing and income decreasing abnormal accruals (Warfield et al., 
1995; Francis et al., 1999; DeFond and Park, 1997; Healy, 1985).  We use the natural log of the absolute 
value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals because the regression residuals are not normally 
distributed if the ABS_PAC is used.  We compute the natural log of ABS_PAC to address this issue of 
non-normality. 
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 The primary variables of interest in this analysis are ACFE (H1) and the 
interaction between ACFE and STRONGGOV (H4).  We expect a negative relation 
between an ACFE and earnings management, indicating that firms with at least one 
ACFE have performance-adjusted discretionary accruals whose absolute value is less 
than firms with no ACFE.  We also expect a negative relation between STRONGGOV, a 
strong corporate governance environment, and abnormal accruals.  The interactive term 
ACFE*STRONGGOV tests whether the relation between an ACFE and earnings 
management is dependent on the strength of the firm’s overall corporate governance 
environment.  This interaction variable essentially tests whether ACFEs and other 
corporate governance mechanisms are substitutes or complements, as it relates to 
earnings management.   
Consistent with DeFond et al. (2005), we create a composite measure of overall 
corporate governance quality using six equally weighted governance characteristics.  The 
six governance characteristics and their measurements are (one always equals stronger 
governance): 
Board size 
 
=
 
1 if the firm’s board size is less than the sample 
median, else 0; 
Board independence 
 
=
 
1 if 60 percent or more of the firm’s directors are 
independent, else 0; 
Audit committee size 
 
 
=
 
 
1 if the proportion of the firm’s audit committee 
size to its board size is greater than the sample 
median, else 0; 
Audit committee independence 
 
=
 
1 if the audit committee is 100 percent 
independent, else 0; 
Shareholders’ rights 
 
 
=
 
 
1 if the firm’s Corporate Governance Quotient 
(per Institutional Shareholder Services) is greater 
than the sample median, else 0;9 
                                                 
9 DeFond et al. (2005) use the G index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) to measure shareholder rights.  
They obtain the G index from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database.  The G index 
is skewed toward larger companies; only 135 of the companies in our sample had a G index available on 
the IRRC database.  Therefore, we use Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ), a comparable index to the G index, to measure shareholder rights.  The G index has 24 
factors and includes measurements of whether firms have staggered board terms, allow cumulative voting, 
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Institutional ownership 
 
 
=
 
 
1 if the firm’s percentage of institutional 
ownership is greater than the sample median, else 
0. 
 
We define a firm as having strong corporate governance if the summation of the 
individual governance measures for a particular firm equals or exceeds the sample 
median for this measure.10  In addition to DeFond et al. (2005), other researchers have 
found the above factors to be associated with good corporate governance.    Jensen (1993) 
argues that smaller boards are more effective monitors and Yermack (1996) finds that 
smaller boards are associated with higher firm value.  A number of prior studies find that 
better corporate governance is associated with board independence (e.g., see Weisbach, 
1988;  Dechow et al., 1996;  Core et al., 1999;  and Klein, 2002a), with audit committee 
independence (e.g., see Carcello and Neal, 2000; 2003; Klein, 2002a; Abbott et al., 2004; 
Anderson et al., 2004; and Bédard et al., 2004), and with audit committee size (Abbott et 
al., 2004; Anderson et al.. 2004).  LaPorta et al. (2002) find higher firm valuation in 
countries with better protection of shareholders’ rights.  Finally, studies find that 
institutional owners play an important role in firm governance through their monitoring 
of management (e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Coffee, 1991; and Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003).   
In addition to the variables of interest, we control for several factors suggested by 
previous literature as being associated with audit committee characteristics and/or 
abnormal accruals.  Klein (2002a) and Warfield et al. (1995) find that abnormal accruals 
                                                                                                                                                 
and have poison pills (DeFond et al. 2005).  The CGQ has 61 factors and includes measurements of charter 
and bylaw provisions, anti-takeover provisions, executive and director compensation, and ownership.  A 
large majority of our original sample has an available CGQ.  Thirty-six observations from our initial 
sample of 350 are excluded because of a missing CGQ.  
 
10 The sample median for the summation of the individual governance measures is three.  The sample 
medians for the individual governance characteristics are: board size (seven), board independence (0.67), 
the proportion of audit committee size to board size (0.43), audit committee independence (100 percent), 
shareholders’ rights (47), and institutional ownership (0.48).   
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are positively associated with a firm’s market-to-book ratio and negatively associated 
with size.  Firm leverage, cash flow from operations, and the presence of a Big 4 auditor 
have been found to be negatively related to abnormal accruals (Warfield et al. 1995; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Bartov et al. 2000; Frankel et 
al. 2002).  Finally, Reynolds and Francis (2000) note that the Modified Jones Model may 
overestimate accruals for poorly performing firms.  Thus we include DISTRESS, a 
measure of the firm’s financial condition, in the model to control for these concerns.  
Consistent with Reynolds and Francis, we expect a positive relation between a firm’s 
financial distress and abnormal accruals.   
We then extend this initial model to test whether the type of ACFE matters – that 
is, we create separate dummy variables for whether an accounting (H2a) or a non-
accounting (H2b) ACFE is on the audit committee.  We expect the coefficient on 
ACC_ACFE to be negative.  And, if non-accounting ACFEs are similar to accounting 
ACFEs – essentially what is implied by the SEC’s Final Rule – than we would expect the 
coefficient for NONACC_ACFE to be negative as well.  However, given the lack of 
significant stock price reaction upon the appointment of a non-accounting ACFE to the 
board (DeFond et al. 2005), the relation between abnormal accruals and 
NONACC_ACFE may be weaker than the relation between abnormal accruals and 
ACC_ACFE. 
Finally, we extend our base model by examining the associations between 
earnings management and ACC_ACFE and NONACC_ACFE, limiting our consideration 
to only those financial experts that are independent (H3a and H3b).  The SEC requires the 
disclosure of whether the firm’s ACFE is independent (SEC 2003b), suggesting that non-
independent ACFEs may be less effective monitors of the financial reporting process. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics in aggregate and by whether the firm has at 
least one accounting ACFE, a non-accounting ACFE but no accounting ACFE, or if the 
firm discloses not having an ACFE.  As expected, firms with at least one accounting 
ACFE have lower absolute values of abnormal accruals than firms with no ACFE (p < 
0.10).  However, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is not significantly different 
between firms with an accounting ACFE and a non-accounting ACFE; nor is there a 
significant difference between firms with at least one non-accounting ACFE and firms 
with no ACFE.  Interestingly, firms with a non-accounting ACFE are larger than firms 
with an accounting financial expert (p < 0.10).   In addition, firms with no ACFE are less 
likely to engage a Big 4 audit firm than firms with an accounting ACFE (p < 0.10) or 
with a non-accounting ACFE (p < 0.01).   
 Table 3 presents the correlations11 among the independent variables.  All but four 
of the correlations fall between +/- 0.35, which suggests that the variables included in our 
model measure distinct features.  The highest correlation is 0.76, which reflects a 
significant positive relation between DISTRESS and LEVERAGE.  This relation was not 
unexpected given that a key component of the distress measure is the debt to assets ratio.  
The only other control variables with correlations greater than +/- 0.35 are those between 
the market to book ratio and operating cash flow (-0.64), and between BIG4 and SIZE 
(0.51).  Given these high correlations, we calculate variance inflation factors for all 
                                                 
11 We present Pearson correlations for continuous variables and Spearman correlations for dichotomous 
variables. 
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models and find that the highest VIF is 7.01, which is within acceptable limits.12  Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in any of our models.  
 
4.2 Multivariate results 
4.2.1 Earnings Management and Financial Expertise 
Table 4 contains the results of the regression model used to test the relation 
between abnormal accruals and the presence of an ACFE.  The overall model is highly 
significant (p < 0.01), and the model’s pseudo-R2 is nine percent.  Consistent with our 
expectation in H1, the coefficient on ACFE is significantly negative (p < 0.05), indicating 
that firms with at least one ACFE have lower levels of abnormal accruals than firms with 
no ACFE.  We also find that firms with a stronger overall corporate governance 
environment (STRONGGOV) have a lower level of abnormal accruals (p < 0.05).  The 
interactive term ACFE*STRONGGOV tests whether a financial expert and other 
governance mechanisms are complements or substitutes.  The significant positive 
coefficient on the interactive term (p < 0.10) indicates that the relation between abnormal 
accruals and an ACFE is conditional on the strength of the firm’s overall corporate 
governance environment, and is consistent with a substitution effect between ACFE and 
STRONGGOV. To demonstrate these associations more clearly, we test whether (b1 + 
b3), the sum of the coefficients on ACFE and ACFE*STRONGGOV, is significantly 
different from zero.  We find that (b1 + b3) is not significantly different from zero (F = 
0.22, p > 0.10), indicating that the negative association between earnings management 
and an ACFE only applies for those firms with weak alternate corporate governance 
                                                 
12 Gujuarati (1995, 339) suggests that as long as the VIF is less than 10.0 multicollinearity is unlikely to be 
a problem.   
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mechanisms.  These results suggest that a firm’s overall corporate governance 
environment can substitute for the presence of an ACFE and vice versa. 
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with previous 
literature.  Abnormal accruals are positively related to the market-to-book ratio (p < 0.05) 
and to financial distress (p < 0.05), and negatively related to firm size (p < 0.05), firm 
leverage (p < 0.10), and whether or not the firm engaged a Big 4 auditor (p < 0.10).  
There is no significant relation between abnormal accruals and operating cash flows.    
 
4.2.2. Earnings Management and Type of Audit Committee Financial Expert 
Although we find a significantly negative relation between earnings management 
and the presence of an ACFE, that negative association could be driven by accounting 
ACFEs, by non-accounting ACFEs, or by both groups.  In Table 5, we examine the 
separate relations between accounting financial experts (ACC_ACFE) and non-
accounting financial experts (NONACC_ACFE) and earnings management.   
We find a significantly negative coefficient between an ACC_ACFE and earnings 
management (p < 0.05), supporting H2a which proposes a negative association between 
an accounting financial expert and earnings management.  In contrast, the coefficient on 
NONACC_ACFE is insignificantly different from zero, indicating no systematic relation 
between earnings management and non-accounting financial experts (H2b).  Thus, 
similar to DeFond et al.’s (2005) price reaction data, we find differences between 
accounting and non-accounting financial experts.  
The coefficient on STRONGGOV is significantly negative (p < 0.05), suggesting 
that alternative corporate governance mechanisms still play a role in mitigating earnings 
management. The positive coefficient on the interactive term ACC_ACFE* 
 24
STRONGGOV suggests a trade-off between having an accounting financial expert on the 
audit committee and a strong corporate governance environment (p < 0.10).13  We note 
that the coefficients and the significance levels of the control variables are generally 
consistent with Table 4.  In addition, the insignificant coefficient on the interactive term 
NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV is consistent with there being little to no impact of 
including a non-accounting financial expert on the audit committee. 
In summary, our empirical results in Table 5 support the view that financial 
experts with accounting backgrounds and experiences are better able to monitor earnings 
management than financial experts without accounting backgrounds.  The results also 
support the hypothesis that accounting financial experts and other strong corporate 
governance mechanisms are substitutes for each other. 
 
4.2.3  Further Analyses of Backgrounds of Non-Accounting Audit Committee Financial 
Experts 
 While the accounting financial experts’ backgrounds are fairly similar, that is, 
they all have hands on experience with preparing financial statements, the backgrounds 
of the non-accounting financial experts are more diverse.  However, a closer examination 
of the non-accounting ACFEs reveals that we can essentially bifurcate our sample of non-
accounting ACFEs into two groups: (1) senior business executives and (2) all other non-
accounting ACFEs.  We define EXEC as an indicator equal to one if the non-accounting 
ACFE is a current or retired senior manager in another firm, that is, a CEO, Chairman of 
the Board, President, Chief Operating Officer, or Vice President.  OTHER is an indicator 
                                                 
13 An insignificantly positive “coefficient” on (b1 + b4), supports this finding (p = 0.46). 
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variable equal to one if the non-accounting financial expert is not a current or retired 
senior manager in another firm.  Non-accounting financial experts who are not a current 
or retired senior manager include investment bankers, venture capitalists, private 
investors, consultants, attorneys, academics, retirees, principals, and directors.14  
 In devising these two categories, we note that the SEC explicitly states that 
investment bankers and venture capitalists are likely to qualify as ACFEs (SEC, 2003b).  
Thus, they endorse the notion that users of financial statements qualify as financial 
experts. Conversely, the NASDAQ explicitly includes chief executive officers or other 
senior officers with financial oversight responsibilities within its description of who 
qualifies as a financial expert (NASDAQ listing standards).  We recognize that our two 
classifications are based on our perceptions of who fits into each category, and that these 
perceptions may add noise to our two independent variables. Based on our findings in the 
last section that NONACC_ACFE is not systematically related to earnings management, 
we make no predictions about whether one or both classifications of NONACC_ACFE 
will be associated with less earnings management.  
Table 6 presents the results of our analysis where the NONACC_ACFE variable 
is replaced by EXEC and OTHER.  The overall model is highly significant (p < 0.01) and 
the model’s pseudo-R2 is nine percent.  We continue to find a significantly negative 
relation between ACC_ACFE and earnings management for firms with weak corporate 
governance (p < 0.05).  However, unlike the insignificantly negative coefficient on 
NONACC_ACFE that we report in Table 5, Table 6 shows a significantly negative 
relation between non-accounting financial experts who are not senior business executives 
(OTHER) and earnings management (p < 0.10), but no significant relation between those 
                                                 
14 No one type of background predominates among non-accounting ACFEs who are not current or retired 
senior managers.  For example, there are five venture capitalists, four consultants, four directors, three 
private investors, three attorneys, and three principals. 
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non-accounting ACFEs who have a background as a senior business executive and 
earnings management.  We also find insignificant coefficients on the interactive terms 
EXEC*STRONGGOV and OTHER*STRONGGOV.15 
The results in Table 6 weakly suggest that firms can achieve the benefits of 
improved monitoring of the financial reporting process by adding a non-accounting 
financial expert to the audit committee, as long as this individual is not a senior business 
executive.  One possible explanation for this result is that senior business executives on 
audit committees may be less vigilant in monitoring the financial reporting process, either 
because of the demands of their full-time positions or because they expect management 
to properly have some discretion in managing the accrual process.  This result is clearly 
preliminary and calls for further study with larger sample sizes.  
 
4.2.4  Director Independence and the Background of the Audit Committee Financial 
Expert 
Our analyses up to this point have examined the association between earnings 
management and the presence of an audit committee financial expert regardless of 
whether the financial expert is independent.  However, Klein (2002a) finds a negative 
relation between earnings management and the percentage of independent directors on 
the audit committee, suggesting that a financial expert’s effectiveness in monitoring the 
financial reporting process may differ depending on whether or not the expert is 
independent. 
We define an independent director as one who (1) does not work for the company 
beyond being a director and (2) does not have any other financial or personal relationship 
                                                 
15 A joint test of the OTHER and OTHER*STRONGGOV coefficients (b3 + b7) is not significantly 
different from zero (p = 0.99) indicating that other non-accounting financial experts are not effective in 
reducing earnings management for firms with strong corporate governance. 
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with the firm.   Using this definition, we classify 130 ACC_ACFEs as independent and 
11 as non-independent of management.  Similarly, we find that 73 EXECs and 12 
OTHERs are independent, whereas four EXECs and one OTHER are not independent of 
management. 
We examine the associations between independent ACC_ACFEs, independent 
EXECs, and independent OTHERs and earnings management. We create three dummy 
variables, ACC_ACFE_IND, EXEC_IND, and OTHER_IND each equal to one 
respectively for independent directors with that background, and zero otherwise.16 
Table 7 presents the empirical results. Consistent with our expectations in H3a, 
independent ACFEs appear to be more effective than non-independent ACFEs.  First, 
there is a significantly negative relation between earnings management and an 
ACC_ACFE_IND (p < 0.01).  More telling, however, we find that the negative relation 
between earnings management and an ACC_ACFE is stronger when the ACC_ACFE is 
independent. That is, we test whether the coefficient on the ACC_ACFE_IND variable 
from Table 7 is significantly different from the coefficient on the ACC_ACFE variable 
from Table 6.  We find a significant difference between coefficients (chi-square = 2.86; p 
< 0.05), supporting the hypothesis that director independence and an accounting 
background together deter earnings management more than just an accounting 
background alone. 
Similarly, we find a significantly negative relation between earnings management 
and OTHER_IND (p < 0.05).  When we compare the coefficient on OTHER_IND in 
Table 7 with the coefficient on OTHER in Table 6, we reject the hypothesis that they are 
                                                 
16 We also do the analysis without disaggregating NONACC_ACFE into EXEC and OTHER, creating a 
dummy variable equal to one if any non-accounting ACFE is independent and zero otherwise.  Our analysis 
with this variable is similar to what we report with the EXEC_IND and OTHER_IND variables in this 
section and therefore do not include it. 
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equal, and find, instead that OTHER_IND is significantly less than OTHER (chi-square = 
2.52; p < 0.10). Thus independence matters as well for non-accounting ACFEs who are 
not senior business executives. 
In contrast, we find that the coefficient on EXEC_IND to be insignificantly 
different from zero.  This finding corroborates our inference in the last section that senior 
executives of other companies, even those who are independent of managers, appear to 
be less effective monitors of the firm’s financial reporting system. 
In Table 7, STRONGGOV remains significantly negative, consistent with the 
hypothesis that a strong corporate governance environment is negatively associated with 
earnings management.  Moreover, the significant positive coefficient on 
ACC_ACFE_IND*STRONGGOV (p < 0.10) indicates that the positive monitoring 
benefits offered by independent accounting experts differ depending on the strength of 
the firm’s corporate governance environment.  We find no such trade-off between non-
accounting ACFEs who are not senior business executives and a strong corporate 
governance environment.17 
 Our combined results from Tables 5-7 indicate that some, but not all, ACFEs 
reduce earnings management.  Specifically, accounting financial experts and non-
accounting ACFEs who are not senior business executives reduce earnings management, 
especially if they are independent, while senior business executives do not.  These results 
suggest that, within large boundaries, firms should be provided with considerable 
flexibility in devising the corporate governance oversight structures that best fits the 
needs of the particular firm. 
 
                                                 
17 A joint test of the OTHER_IND and OTHER_IND*STRONGGOV coefficients (b3 + b7) is not 
significantly different from zero (p = 0.83) indicating that other, independent non-accounting financial 
experts are not effective in reducing earnings management for firms with strong corporate governance. 
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5.  Additional Analyses: When the Accounting Audit Committee Financial Expert 
Joined the Audit Committee 
 The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that 46 percent of the 
accounting financial experts joined the audit committee within the past two years.  It is 
possible that accounting financial experts joining the audit committee post-Enron and 
post-SOX might be more effective in overseeing the financial reporting process.  We 
divide our ACC_ACFE variable into two variables based on when the accounting 
financial expert joined the audit committee – one that measures whether the only 
ACC_ACFE joined the committee within the past two years, the other that measures 
whether one or more ACC_ACFEs were on the audit committee pre-2002.  In results not 
tabled, we find significant negative relations between earnings management and both of 
the ACC_ACFE variables (p < 0.05) for firms with weak corporate governance.  These 
results suggest that the effectiveness of ACC_ACFEs is not limited to only those experts 
being added to the audit committee as a result of SOX. 
 
6.  Financial Expertise, Operating Decisions, and Real Earnings Management 
 Management can manage earnings either through accounting estimates and 
judgments, or through “real” actions that serve to accelerate or delay the recognition of 
discretionary expenditures (e.g., advertising, R&D, training, travel, etc.) (see Schipper 
1989).  Management can also affect earnings through its management of inventory levels.  
In H5, we posit that an ACFE has little effect on real earnings management, because the 
management of discretionary expenditures and production costs is generally not 
fraudulent and would be well within the accepted province of management’s discretion.   
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 Roychowdhury (2005) and Cohen et al. (2005) use a firm’s abnormal level of 
discretionary expenditures and abnormal level of production costs (using a similar 
technique to the modified-Jones model) as metrics of real earnings management.  
Following these papers, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for each 
three, two, or one-digit SIC code, conditional on having at least 20 firms with usable data 
in each SIC group, in order to generate the normal (predicted) levels of discretionary 
expenses and production costs: 
(3) DiscExpi/Assetsi t-1 = a1(1/Assetsi, t-1) + a2 Salesit/Assetsi,t-1 + εit 
(4) Prodit/Assetsi,t-1 = b1(1/Assetsi,t-1) + b2Salesit/Assetsi,t-1 + b3∆Salesit/Assetsi,t-1 +  
   b4∆Salesi,t-1/Assetsi,t-1 + εit 
 
We define discretionary expenditures (DiscExp) as the sum of the firm’s advertising 
expense (Compustat data item #45), R&D expense (data item #46), and selling, general, 
and administrative expense (data item #189).  Abnormal discretionary expenditures for 
firm i is calculated as the difference between its actual discretionary expenditures and its 
normal level of discretionary expenditures.  We define production costs (Prod) as the sum 
of the firm’s cost of goods sold (data item #41) and change in inventories (data item #3).  
Abnormal production costs for firm i is the difference between its actual production costs 
and normal production costs.  Our control variables are drawn from Cohen et al. (2005).  
We control for the natural log of the market value of equity, cash flow from operations, 
audit firm type, and the absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals per 
the Modified Jones model.  In addition, we include discretionary expenditures as an 
explanatory variable in the production cost regression model, and production cost as an 
explanatory variable in the discretionary expenditure model. 
 Table 8 presents the results of these models.  In the production cost regression 
(Panel A), we fail to find significant associations between abnormal production costs and 
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an ACC_ACFE or NONACC_ACFE.  However, in the discretionary expenditures 
regression (Panel B), we find a significantly positive relation between an accounting 
ACFE and abnormal discretionary expenditures (p < 0.05) for those firms with weak 
corporate governance.  In addition, we fail to find a significant relation between the 
strength of the firm’s overall corporate governance environment and abnormal production 
costs, but we find a significantly positive relation between overall corporate governance 
strength, STRONGGOV, and abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
These results, when coupled with our earlier findings, suggest that an accounting 
ACFE can mitigate earnings management via discretionary accruals for firms with a 
weak corporate governance environment, but that managers in these firms react by 
increasing real earnings management (i.e., by reducing discretionary expenditures).  
Moreover, a strong overall corporate governance environment reduces discretionary 
accruals, but here too managers appear to respond by increasing real earnings 
management.  These results suggest that although ACFEs and other corporate governance 
mechanisms are effective in reducing earnings management achieved through accounting 
maneuvers, neither monitoring mechanism appears to have any effect in reducing the 
management of earnings through real operating decisions.  Although the focus of SOX 
and the SEC has been on non-GAAP earnings management, Graham et al. (2005) find 
that CFOs are willing to sacrifice long-term firm value in order to smooth earnings.  As 
suggested by these authors, boards and audit committees may want to exercise greater 
vigilance in overseeing wealth destroying actions by senior management designed to 
smooth earnings. 
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7. Summary, Limitations, and Conclusions 
 We examine the association between earnings management and various types of 
ACFEs in the first year that firms must publicly disclose the identity of their financial 
experts.  We also examine whether the strength of the firm’s overall corporate 
governance environment substitutes for, or complements, the presence of an ACFE.  We 
find that an accounting ACFE consistently is associated with less earnings management 
for firms with weaker overall corporate governance, and that accounting ACFEs who are 
independent are more effective than accounting ACFEs who are not independent.  We 
fail to find a similar relation between earnings management and the presence of a non-
accounting ACFE, unless the non-accounting ACFE is not a current or former senior 
business executive and, as was the case with an accounting ACFE, this result is stronger 
if the non-accounting, non-senior business executive is independent.  Moreover, we find 
that earnings management is not reduced by the presence of an ACFE if the firm has a 
stronger overall corporate governance environment.  These results indicate that the firm’s 
overall governance environment and audit committee financial experts act as substitutes 
for one another.  Finally, we fail to find any relation between ACFEs and management of 
abnormal production costs, but we find a positive relation between an accounting ACFE 
and abnormal discretionary expenditures.  These findings suggests that although 
accounting ACFEs may be effective in constraining the management of accounting 
accruals, management reacts by engaging in real earnings management activities by 
altering the level of discretionary expenditures. 
 Our paper is subject to a number of limitations.  First, our categorization of audit 
committee members as an ACFE is dependent on firms’ public disclosures.  Although 
firms are required to identify at least one ACFE if such an individual exists, the quality 
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and transparency of this disclosure is likely to vary across firms.  Second, our measure of 
earnings management, performance-adjusted abnormal accruals, is only as good as the 
underlying measure.  However, we have computed this measure in accordance with the 
extant literature.  Finally, our results are based on only one year of data.  Our sample is 
representative of the overall Compustat population in that year; and given the lack of 
empirical data on the relation between various types of ACFEs and earnings 
management, especially post-SOX, we provide initial empirical data on an important 
public policy issue.   
 Our results suggest that there are multiple ways of achieving effective oversight 
of the financial reporting process, at least as measured by abnormal accruals.  A stronger 
overall system of corporate governance seems to negate the need for an ACFE.  And an 
accounting ACFE and, to a lesser extent, certain types of non-accounting ACFEs, seem to 
act as effective substitutes for a weaker overall system of corporate governance.  These 
results suggest that regulators should fashion regulations that allow corporate boards and 
management to design the particular mix of monitoring mechanisms that are optimal for 
the firm.  In the area of audit committee financial experts, the U.S. Congress and the SEC 
largely permit this flexibility – an audit committee financial expert is not required (only 
disclosure is required), a financial expert has been defined broadly to include both an 
accounting and a non-accounting financial expert, and the expert does not have to be 
independent (although his or her independence status must be disclosed).  The results of 
our study suggest that this flexibility is optimal. 
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Appendix:  Rules on Defining Financial Expertise 
 
SEC Rule on the Definition of Financial Expertise  
“Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” 
SEC Release Nos. 33-8177; 34-47235; File No. S7-40-02 dated January 23, 2003 
 
The final rules define an audit committee financial expert as a person who has the 
following attributes: 
• An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements; 
• The ability to assess the general application of such principles in connection with 
the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves; 
• Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements that 
present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally 
comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be 
expected to be raised by the registrant’s financial statements, or experience 
actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities; 
• An understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; and 
• An understanding of audit committee functions.  
Under the final rules, a person must have acquired such attributes through any one or 
more of the following: 
(1) Education and experience as a principal financial officer, principal accounting 
officer, controller, public accountant or auditor or experience in one or more 
positions that involve the performance of similar functions; 
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(2) Experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal accounting 
officer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person performing similar 
functions; 
(3) Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or public 
accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial 
statements; or 
(4) Other relevant experience. 
NYSE Listing Requirement on Definition of Financial Expertise (Literacy) 
“NYSE Listing Manual” Section 303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements 
(a) The audit committee must have a minimum of three members. 
Commentary: Each member of the audit committee must be financially literate, as such 
qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board in its business judgment, or 
must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her 
appointment to the audit committee.  In addition, at least one member of the audit 
committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the listed 
company’s board inteprets such qualification in its business judgment.  While the 
Exchange does not require that a listed company’s audit committee include a person who 
satisfies the definition of audit committee financial expert set out in Item 401(h) of 
Regulation S-K, a board may presume that such a person has accounting or related 
financial management expertise. 
 
Nasdaq Listing Requirement on Definition of Financial Expertise (Sophistication) 
“NASD Manual” Section 4350(d)(2) Audit Committee Composition 
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(A) Each issuer must have, and certify that it has and will continue to have, an audit 
committee of at least three members, each of whom must: (i) be independent as defined 
under Rule 4200(a)(15); (ii) meet the criteria for independence set forth in Rule 10A-
3(b)(1) under the Act (subject to the exemptions provided in Rule 10A-3(c)); not have 
participated in the preparation of the financial statements of the company or any current 
subsidiary of the company at any time during the past three years; and (iv) be able to read 
and understand fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, 
income statement, and cash flow statement.  Additionally, each issuer must certify that it 
has, and will continue to have, at least one member of the audit committee who has past 
employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in 
accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the 
individual’s financial sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive 
officer, chief financial officer or other senior officer with financial oversight 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 37
 
Table 1 
 
Job Backgrounds and Tenure of Audit Committee Financial Experts 
 
Panel A - ACFE Background a      
         
  
Accounting Expertise 
(ACC_ACFE) 
(n=160) 
Non-Accounting Expertise 
(NONACC_ACFE) 
(n=157)   
        
Exchange     Other Senior    
(No. of Co.) b  CFO CPA Financial c Executives Other d  Total 
         
SCM (n = 63) 25 14 5 26 7  77
NNM (n = 83) 47 16 2 37 8  110
NYSE (n = 80) 31 15 5 67 12   130
     Total (n = 226) 103 45 12 130 27  317
 
 
Panel B – Tenure on the Audit Committee   
       
    Less than   
    2 years but   
   Less than greater than Greater than  
Firms with  1 year 1 year 2 years Total 
       
At least one ACC_ACFE (n = 141):       
 ACC_ACFE tenure  44 30 86 160 
 NONACC_ACFE tenure  8 6 20 34 
        
At least one NONACC_ACFE       
but no ACC_ACFE (n = 85)  17 17 89 123 
        
      Total  69 53 195 317 
 
___________________________ 
a Current and previous work experience was coded based on the highest position held.  Several 
individuals held multiple positions such as CFO and VP-Finance.  These individuals were 
coded as CFO. 
b SCM stands for Nasdaq Small Cap Market, NNM stands for Nasdaq National Market, and 
NYSE stands for New York Stock Exchange. 
c Indicates individuals who held the position of VP-Finance, treasurer, controller, and one 
individual who is a certified financial analyst. 
d Indicates individuals who held the position of venture capitalist, investment banker, consultant, 
private investor, academic, attorney, director, principal, retiree, and presidential advisor. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Management and Control Variables  
Mean (Median) [Standard Deviation] 
 
    Accounting Non-Accounting No       
  Entire  ACFE Firms ACFE Firms ACFE Firms       
  Sample  (ACC_ACFE) (NONACC_ACFE) (NOACFE) (ACC_ACFE - (ACC_ACFE - (NONACC_ACFE - 
Variablea  (n = 283)  (n = 141) (n = 85) (n = 57) NONACC_ACFE)b NOACFE)b NOACFE)b 
             
ABS_PAC  0.112   0.092 0.124 0.145 -0.032 -0.053* -0.021 
  (0.056)  (0.051) (0.065) (0.058) (-0.013) (-0.007) (0.006) 
  [0.186]  [0.127] [0.200] [0.268]       
             
STRONGGOV  0.633   0.610 0.647 0.667 -0.037 -0.057 -0.020 
  (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  [0.483]  [0.490] [0.481] [0.476]       
             
SIZE  3,510.884   2,347.849 6,900.863 1,332.631 -4,553.014* 1,015.218 5,568.232 
  (225.051)  (237.931) (357.527) (160.147) (-119.596) (77.784) (197.380)* 
  [18,140.260]  [8,240.821] [30,761.640] [6,497.939]       
             
M/B  1.464   1.420 1.267 1.868 0.152 -0.448 -0.600 
  (0.943)  (1.005) (0.791) (0.968) (0.214) (0.036) (-0.178) 
  [2.281]  [1.301] [1.193] [4.427]       
             
DISTRESS  -3.891   -3.945 -3.766 -3.945 -0.179 -0.000 0.179 
  (-4.046)  (-4.208) (-3.892) (-3.919) (-0.316)* (-0.289) (0.027) 
  [1.471]  [1.604] [1.210] [1.494]       
             
OCF  0.020   0.049 0.012 -0.038 0.037 0.086 0.049 
  (0.073)  (0.071) (0.074) (0.079) (-0.004) (-0.008) (-0.005) 
  [0.339]  [0.239] [0.275] [0.565]       
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
    Accounting Non-Accounting No       
  Entire  ACFE Firms ACFE Firms ACFE Firms       
  Sample  (ACC_ACFE) (NONACC_ACFE) (NOACFE) (ACC_ACFE - (ACC_ACFE - (NONACC_ACFE - 
Variable  (n = 283)  (n = 141) (n = 85) (n = 57) NONACC_ACFE)b NOACFE)b NOACFE)b 
             
LEVERAGE  0.188   0.193 0.193 0.167 -0.000 0.026 0.027 
  (0.147)  (0.139) (0.173) (0.138) (-0.035) (0.000) (0.035) 
  [0.205]  [0.230] [0.187] [0.159]       
             
BIG4  0.799   0.801 0.871 0.684 -0.069 0.117 * 0.186 *** 
  (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)*** 
  [0.402]  [0.400] [0.338] [0.469]       
________________________________ 
* and *** indicate significance at p < 0.10 and p < 0.01, respectively, based  on two-tailed tests. 
 
a Variable definitions: 
ABS_PAC = absolute value of the discretionary accrual measure adjusted for performance; 
ACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one accounting audit committee financial expert (ACFE), else 0;  
NONACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE, but no accounting ACFE, else 0;  
STRONGGOV = 1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the sample median, else 0;  
SIZE = firm's price per share at fiscal year end multiplied by the number of shares  
  outstanding (in millions);  
M/B = market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, measured at the   
  beginning of the fiscal year;      
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index;  
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets;  
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets;     
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0.   
 
b Test for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (Z-statistics) for continuous variables (proportions).  Tests in differences in the median are based on 
Wilcoxon rank sum test.  The Wilcoxon rank sum test tests whether the observations in the two groups are from populations with different medians.  Thus, the 
test can indicate a significant difference even though the medians for the two groups are the same. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Correlation Matrix a 
 
Variable b
NONACC_ACFE -0.6529 ***
STRONGGOV -0.0467 0.0198
SIZE 0.0240 0.0708 0.2525 ***
M/B 0.0694 -0.0876 0.0882 0.0799
DISTRESS -0.0884 0.0922 0.0564 -0.0358 0.1033 *
OCF 0.0472 -0.0119 -0.0156 0.1586 *** -0.6446 *** -0.3221 ***
LEVERAGE -0.0268 0.0453 -0.0186 0.1154 * -0.0837 0.7628 *** 0.1111 *
BIG4 0.0070 0.1176 ** 0.0923 0.5056 *** 0.0112 -0.0221 0.0505 0.0756
NONACC_ACFE STRONGGOVACC_ACFE SIZE M/B DISTRESS OCF LEVERAGE
 
________________________________ 
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively, based  on two-tailed tests. 
 
a We report Spearman rank correlation coefficients for ACC_ACFE, NONACC_ACFE, STRONGGOV, and BIG4 and Pearson correlations otherwise. 
 
b Variable definitions: 
 
ACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one accounting audit committee financial expert (ACFE), else 0; 
NONACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE, but no accounting ACFE, else 0; 
STRONGGOV = 1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B = market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Regression of Earnings Management on Audit Committee 
Financial Expertise and Control Variables 
 
LN_ABS_PAC = b0 + b1ACFE + b2STRONGGOV + b3ACFE*STRONGGOV +  b4SIZE + 
b5M/B + b6DISTRESS + b7OCF + b8LEVERAGE + b9BIG4 + ε 
  
   Exp.  Estimated    
Variable a  Sign  Coefficients  t-statistic 
           
INTERCEPT  -0.6252 -1.05  
ACFE - -0.6052 -1.93 ** 
STRONGGOV - -0.6785 -1.94 ** 
ACFE*STRONGGOV ? 0.7130 1.83 * 
SIZE - -0.0908 -2.16 ** 
M/B + 0.0919 2.02 ** 
DISTRESS + 0.2339 2.23 ** 
OCF - 0.2960 0.79  
LEVERAGE - -1.1167 -1.56 * 
BIG4 - -0.3425 -1.60 * 
     
N     283     
χ2      4.02     
p-value     0.0001     
Adjusted R2     0.09     
________________________________ 
* and ** indicate significance at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-
tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted. 
 
a Variable definitions: 
 
LN_ABS_PAC 
 
= 
 
natural log of absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary 
accruals; 
              ACFE 
 
= 
 
1 if the firm names at least one audit committee financial expert (ACFE), 
else 0; 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the 
sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B 
 
= 
 
market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Regression of Earnings Management on Accounting and Non-Accounting 
 Financial Expertise and Control Variables 
 
LN_ABS_PAC = b0 + b1ACC_ACFE + b2NONACC_ACFE + b3STRONGGOV + 
b4ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + b5NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + 
b6SIZE + b7M/B + b8DISTRESS + b9OCF + b10LEVERAGE + b11BIG4 + ε 
  
   Exp.  Estimated    
Variable a  Sign  Coefficients  t-statistic 
           
INTERCEPT  -0.6514 -1.09  
ACC_ACFE - -0.6899 -2.09 ** 
NONACC_ACFE - -0.4452 -1.22  
STRONGGOV - -0.6750 -1.93 ** 
ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV ? 0.7135 1.74 * 
NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV ? 0.6984 1.55  
SIZE - -0.0939 -2.21 ** 
M/B + 0.0963 2.10 ** 
DISTRESS + 0.2254  2.13 ** 
OCF - 0.3187 0.84  
LEVERAGE - -1.0653 -1.48 * 
BIG4 - -0.3575 -1.66 ** 
           
N 283   
χ2  3.46   
p-value  0.0002   
Adjusted R2  0.09   
________________________________ 
* and ** indicate significance at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-
tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
a Variable definitions: 
 
LN_ABS_PAC 
 
= 
 
natural log of absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary 
accruals; 
ACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one accounting ACFE, else 0; 
NONACC_ACFE 
 
= 
 
1 if firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE, but no accounting ACFE, 
else 0; 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the 
sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B 
 
= 
 
market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
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Table 6 
 
Regression of Earnings Management on Accounting Financial Experts, Senior Business 
Executives, Other Non-Accounting Financial Expertise and Control Variables 
 
LN_ABS_PAC = b0 + b1ACC_ACFE + b2EXEC + b3 OTHER + b4STRONGGOV + 
b5ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + b6EXEC*STRONGGOV + 
b7OTHER*STRONGGOV + b8SIZE + b9M/B + b10DISTRESS + b11OCF 
+ b12LEVERAGE + b13BIG4 + ε 
  
   Exp.  Estimated    
Variable a  Sign  Coefficients  t-statistic 
           
INTERCEPT  -0.6090 -1.01  
ACC_ACFE - -0.6889 -2.09 ** 
EXEC ? -0.2798 -0.72  
OTHER ? -0.9597 -1.75 * 
STRONGGOV - -0.6781 -1.93 ** 
ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV ? 0.7227 1.76 * 
EXEC*STRONGGOV ? 0.5658 1.20  
OTHER*STRONGGOV ? 0.9538 1.19  
SIZE - -0.0939 -2.20 ** 
M/B + 0.0920 1.99 ** 
DISTRESS + 0.2269 2.14 ** 
OCF - 0.2739 0.72  
LEVERAGE - -1.0984 -1.53 * 
BIG4 - -0.3908 -1.80 ** 
           
           
N     283     
χ2      3.06     
p-value     0.0003     
Adjusted R2     0.09     
________________________________ 
* and ** indicate significance at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-
tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
a Variable definitions: 
 
LN_ABS_PAC 
 
= 
 
natural log of absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary 
accruals; 
ACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one accounting ACFE, else 0; 
EXEC 
 
 
= 
 
 
1 if firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE with current or previous 
experience as a CEO, President, Vice-President, or Chairman of the Board 
but no ACC_ACFE, else 0; 
OTHER  
 
= 
 
1 if the firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE, but no ACC_ACFE or 
EXEC, else 0. 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the 
sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B 
 
= 
 
market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
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TABLE 7 
 
Regression of Earnings Management on Independent Accounting Financial Experts, Senior 
Business Executives, Other Non-Accounting Financial Expertise and Control Variables 
 
LN_ABS_PAC = b0 + b1ACC_ACFE_IND + b2EXEC_IND + b3OTHER_IND + 
b4STRONGGOV + b5ACC_ACFE_IND*STRONGGOV + 
b6EXEC_IND*STRONGGOV + b7OTHER_IND*STRONGGOV + b8SIZE 
+ b9M/B + b10DISTRESS + b11OCF + b12LEVERAGE + b13BIG4 + ε 
  
   Exp.  Estimated    
Variable a  Sign  Coefficients  t-statistic 
           
INTERCEPT  -0.4827 -0.83  
ACC_ACFE_IND - -0.8760 -2.87 *** 
EXEC_IND ? -0.5166 -1.42  
OTHER_IND ? -1.2851 -2.27 ** 
STRONGGOV - -0.6882 -2.18 ** 
ACC_ACFE_IND*STRONGGOV ? 0.7355 1.92 * 
EXEC_IND*STRONGGOV ? 0.6087 1.37  
OTHER_IND*STRONGGOV ? 1.1592 1.43  
SIZE - -0.0825 -1.95 ** 
M/B + 0.0849 1.85 * 
DISTRESS + 0.2345 2.23 ** 
OCF - 0.2509 0.66  
LEVERAGE - -1.1874 -1.66 * 
BIG4 - -0.3810 -1.78 * 
           
           
N     283     
χ2      3.39     
p-value     0.0001     
Adjusted R2     0.10     
________________________________ 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively, based on one-
tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted. 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
a Variable definitions: 
 
LN_ABS_PAC 
 
= 
 
Natural log of absolute value of performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals; 
ACC_ACFE_IND = 1 if firm has at least one independent accounting ACFE, else 0; 
EXEC_IND 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
1 if firm has at least one independent non-accounting ACFE with 
current or previous experience as a CEO, President, Vice-
President, or Chairman of the Board but no independent 
ACC_ACFE, else 0; 
OTHER_IND  
 
= 
 
1 if the firm has at least one independent non-accounting ACFE, 
but no independent ACC_ACFE or EXEC, else 0. 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal 
to the sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = Natural log of market value of equity; 
M/B 
 
= 
 
market value of the total firm divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DISTRESS = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index; 
OCF 
 
= 
 
cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year 
total assets; 
LEVERAGE = total debt divided by total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0. 
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TABLE 8 
 
Regressions of Real Earnings Management on Audit Committee 
Financial Experts and Control Variables 
 
Panel A: Production Costs 
 
PRODCOST = b0 + b1ACC_ACFE + b2NONACC_ACFE + b3STRONGGOV + 
b4ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + b5NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + 
b6SIZE + b7OCF + b8BIG4 + b9ABSPAC + b10DISCEXP + ε 
 
   Estimated    
Variable a  Coefficients  t-statistic 
         
INTERCEPT -0.1724 -0.99 
ACC_ACFE 0.1719 1.08 
NONACC_ACFE 0.1379 0.80 
STRONGGOV 0.1515 0.90 
ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV -0.0401 -0.20 
NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV -0.0275 -0.13 
SIZE 0.0060 0.32 
OCF -0.5710 -5.15*** 
BIG4 -0.1546 -1.50 
ABSPAC -0.7381 -3.53*** 
DISCEXP -0.0912 -4.04*** 
   
Number of Observations  280     
Chi-Square for Model 5.67     
 (degrees of freedom) 10   
p-value 0.0000   
Adjusted R-squared 0.14   
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Discretionary Expenditures 
 
DISCEXP = b0 + b1ACC_ACFE + b2NONACC_ACFE + b3STRONGGOV + 
b4ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + b5NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV + 
b6SIZE + b7OCF + b8BIG4 + b9ABSPAC + b10PRODCOST + ε 
 
   Estimated    
Variable a  Coefficients  t-statistic 
         
INTERCEPT -1.4641 -3.26*** 
ACC_ACFE 0.9584 2.32** 
NONACC_ACFE 0.7426 1.64 
STRONGGOV 0.8272 1.89* 
ACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV -0.7935 -1.54 
NONACC_ACFE*STRONGGOV -0.3197 -0.57 
SIZE -0.0120 -0.24 
OCF -1.5001 -5.15*** 
BIG4 0.3769 1.39 
ABSPAC 1.6061 2.91*** 
PRODCOST -0.6286 -4.04*** 
   
Number of Observations  280     
Chi-Square for Model 7.10     
 (degrees of freedom) 10   
p-value 0.0001   
Adjusted R-squared 0.18   
________________________________ 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
 
a Variable definitions: 
PRODCOST 
 
= 
 
the level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined 
as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories; 
DISCEXP 
 
 
= 
 
 
the level of abnormal discretionary expenditures, where discretionary 
expenses are the sum of advertising, expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A 
expenses; 
ACC_ACFE = 1 if firm has at least one accounting ACFE, else 0; 
NONACC_ACFE 
 
= 
 
1 if firm has at least one non-accounting ACFE, but no accounting ACFE, 
else 0; 
STRONGGOV 
 
= 
 
1 if the summary measure of governance is greater than or equal to the 
sample median, else 0; 
SIZE = natural log of market value of equity; 
OCF = cash flow from operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets; 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm engaged one of the largest four audit firms, else 0; 
ABSPAC = the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals. 
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